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INTRODUCTION

Many local historic preservation statutes are characterized by economic hardship
provisions in the permit review process that allow municipalities to avoid compensation
liability under the Takings Clause.1 New York City, for example, has provided that a
certificate of appropriateness can be granted if the applicant demonstrates that she cannot
earn a statutorily set "reasonable rate of return" on the property in its present state.2 Some
cities, including the District of Columbia, have drafted their preservation laws in a manner
that specifically incorporates the federal constitutional standard for a taking, in order to
fully understand the operation of the economic hardship provision of the DC Historic
District and Historic Landmark Protection Act, it is necessary to have a working knowledge
of constitutional takings jurisprudence.
Although many local historic preservation laws have economic hardship provisions,
the District of Columbia is unique in providing a separate economic hardship standard for
low-income property owners. This provision provides a heightened level of protection for
property owned by low-income individuals. This paper will discuss the original purposes
of the provision, the benefits of a separate standard for low-income individuals, and the
potential for the provision's abuse by unscrupulous developers. Although the intentions
underlying the creation of the provision were quite laudable, the

1

See, e.g., San Antonio Historic Preservation Ordinance, SAN ANTONIO MUN. § 35-7002 (2003) (defining
unreasonable economic hardship as "an economic burden imposed upon the owner which is unduly excessive
and prevents a realization of a reasonable rate of return on the value of his property as an investment,
applying the test utilized by the Supreme Court of Texas in construing Article I, Section 17 of the
Constitution of the State of Texas, 1876, in determining the existence of an unreasonable economic
hardship."); Lake Forest [Illinois] Historic Residential Historic Preservation Ordinance, LAKE FOREST CITY
CODE § 51-6 (2003) (providing for a certificate of economic hardship when denial of a permit results in
"denial of all reasonable use of and return from the property.").
2
NYC CODE § 25-309 (2002). The statute defines a reasonable rate of return as a "net annual return of six per
centum of the valuation of an improvement parcel." Id. at § 25-302(v).
1

benefits of the low-income standard, as it is presently administered, are more than
outweighed by its potential costs. This paper will conclude by examining the safeguards
that are available to prevent such abuse.
REGULATORY TAKINGS AND UNREASONABLE ECONOMIC HARDSHIP IN THE DC LAW

The District of Columbia Historic District and Historic Landmark Protection Act

In 1978, the DC Council enacted the Historic District and Historic Landmark
Protection Act.3 In addition to establishing procedures for the designation of historic
districts and individual landmarks, the Act also provided a detailed statutory framework for
reviewing demolitions, alterations, subdivisions, and new construction within historic
districts and on landmark properties.4 Under the Act, any application to demolish a
landmark property or a contributing structure within an historic district is subject to review
by the DC Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB).5 If it finds that the proposed
demolition or alteration is "compatible" with the purposes of the Act, the HPRB
recommends approval of the permit application to the Mayor's Agent.6 If, however, the
Board determines that the proposed work will be incompatible with the landmark or the
character of the historic district, it recommends denial of the permit.
Section 6-1104 of the DC Law provides that no demolition "permit shall be issued
unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public interest, or that
failure to issue a permit will result in an unreasonable economic hardship to the

3

Historic Landmark and Historic District Protection Act, B.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1101, et seq. (2003).
Id. at §§ 6-1104 (demolition), 6-1105 (alteration), 6-1106 (subdivision), and 6-1107 (new construction).
5
Id. at §6-1104.
6
Id. at § 6-1103. The Mayor's authority under the DC Law has been delegated to the Mayor's Agent, an
administrative law judge.
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owner."7 Section 6-1102 of the Act defines "necessary in the public interest" as either: 1)
consistent with the purposes of the Act; or 2) necessary to construct a project of special
merit.8 Section 6-1102 of the Act also provides that a property owner experiences
unreasonable economic hardship when "failure to issue a permit would amount to a taking
of the owner's property without just compensation."9 Additionally, "low-income owners"
suffer unreasonable economic hardship if a permit denial imposes an "onerous and
excessive financial burden" upon them.10
This test was clearly designed to avoid compensation liability under the Takings
Clause. Councilmember John Wilson introduced Bill 2-367 in the DC Council on June
28,1978.11 As originally introduced, the bill provided that the Mayor could issue a
demolition permit if a denial would impose an "undue economic hardship" upon the
applicant.12 The bill defined undue economic hardship as a condition in which "the owner's
return from and use of the property are unreasonably limited without the fault of the
owner."13 Two days before the bill was introduced, the Supreme Court handed down its
landmark decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which upheld
the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law against facial and as-applied takings
challenges.14 When the amended bill emerged from the Committee on Housing and Urban
Development in September, the provision had been modified to incorporate
7

Id. at §6-1104.
Id. at § 6-1102. "Special merit" is defined as "a plan or a building having significant benefits to the District
of Columbia or to the community by virtue of exemplary architecture, specific features of land planning, or
social or other benefits having a high priority for community services." Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
8

11

COMMITTEEONHOUSING&URBANDEVELOPMENT,COUNCILOFD.C.,REPORTONBILL2-367,1 (Oct. 5, 1978) [hereinafter
COMMITTEE REPORT].
12
D.C.Bill 2-367, §3(1978).
13
Id.
3

the constitutional takings standard established in Penn Central)5 By adopting the federal
regulatory takings standard in designing the provision, the DC Council insured that the
denial of a demolition permit would almost never result in a taking of private property
requiring compensation. It is important to note, however, that this provision merely
provided a statutory standard for permit review. Whether the denial of a demolition permit
effects an unconstitutional regulatory taking, on the other hand, is determined by federal
constitutional law. It is this federal standard that provides content to the economic hardship
provision of the DC Law. The DC Council emphasized this point, noting that because the
statutory definition "is designed to embody the constitutional standard as defined by the
United States Supreme Court, the precise legal boundaries of this definition may change
from time to time as the Court defines a taking for these purposes."16 This distinction, as
explained below, has a number of important practical implications for litigation purposes.

Regulatory Takings and Historic Preservation

14

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 11 at 6. In addition to citing Penn Central, the Committee's report also
refers to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Maker v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975). The
Committee noted that an applicant claiming economic hardship must demonstrate that:
(i) He cannot continue to use the property; and
(ii) He cannot sell the property for an amount which would give him a reasonable return based on
his actual investment; and
(iii) He cannot sell the property for a price which would not be confiscatory based upon his actual
investment; and
(iv) The property is not suitable for adaptive reuse; and
(v) His inability to use, rent, sell, or reuse the property is not the result of his own fault, for
example, because through his own failure of maintenance the property has declined in value or
become uninhabitable. Id. at 6-7.
Although these are useful criteria, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Maker is not binding precedent in the
District of Columbia.
16
Id. 7.
15
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Determining the constitutional validity of a land use regulation under the Takings
Clause involves what is essentially a two-tiered inquiry. First, a court must determine
whether the operation of the regulation deprives an owner of "all economically viable use"
of his or her property. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the regulation effects
aperse taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 If, however, the property
retains any value whatsoever, the court must evaluate the regulation under the three-part
test articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.18 Under Penn
Central, courts engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" that examine: 1) the
economic impact of the regulation; 2) the regulation's interference with distinct, investmentbacked expectations; and 3) the nature of the governmental action.19 While courts
occasionally engage in a full Penn Central analysis when hearing takings challenges to land
use regulations, challenges to permit denials under historic preservation schemes are often
subjected to a truncated version of test, which simply asks whether the regulation has
denied the owner "all economically beneficial use" of the burdened property.20 Because
most historic preservation laws allow owners to continue using protected properties in their
current condition, the denial of a demolition permit will almost never fail under this
standard. In fact, in the twenty-five years since Penn Central was decided, there have been
only three reported cases in which restrictions

17

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., 900 G Street Associates v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387 (D.C.
1981). See also RICHARD MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 314-15 (1999) ("[State courts], while giving lip service to the three-factor Penn Central
test, often require complete elimination of economic use for a taking—which Penn Central does not.").
5
18

imposed under an historic preservation ordinance were held to violate the Takings
Clause.21

Regulatory Takings vs. Unreasonable Economic Hardship

The distinction between a violation of the Takings Clause and an unreasonable
economic hardship under the DC Act is significant for a number of reasons. First, a
property owner who wants to challenge the denial of a demolition permit on grounds of
unreasonable economic hardship must seek judicial review of the Mayor's Agent's decision
in the DC Court of Appeals.22 The plaintiff can argue that the finding of no unreasonable
economic hardship was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence in
the record, or on any of the other grounds for reversal described in the DC Administrative
Procedure Act.23 A regulatory takings challenge to a permit denial, on the other hand, is
properly filed as an original action in the DC Superior Court or in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Such actions are most commonly filed under 42 U.S.C.
§1983.
21

Keeler v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996); United Artists' Theater
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1991), rev'd, 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993); Broadview
Apartments Co. v. Commission for Historical and Architectural Preservation, 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec..
App. 1981). See generally J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation Laws
After Penn Central (manuscript on file with author).
22
DC Administrative Procedure Act, D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1510(a) (2003) ("Any person suffering a legal
wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested
case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review.").
23
Id. at § l-1510(a)(3). The DC Court of Appeals may set aside any action or findings and conclusions found
to be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations short of statutory jurisdiction,
authority or limitations or short of statutory rights;
(D) Without observance of procedure required by law, including any applicable procedure
provided by this subchapter; or
(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding before the Court. Id.
6

Second, the proper remedy for a successful appeal of a Mayor's Agent's decision on
economic hardship grounds is reversal of the decision and issuance of the original permit.
The DC Court of Appeals does not have the authority to award compensation as a
remedy.24 The proper remedy for a successful takings challenge to a permit denial, on the
other hand, is just compensation for the property "taken."25 The district court cannot direct
the Mayor's Agent to issue a demolition permit that had previously been denied. Such relief
is only available in the DC Court of Appeals. At first glance, this distinction seems to offer
the plaintiff a choice between obtaining compensation for the property taken and forcing
issuance of the demolition permit. If a plaintiff seeks compensation, she should file an
original action in the district court; if she prefers the issuance of a permit, then a petition for
review in the DC Court of Appeals is the appropriate procedural route. A close reading of
the DC Act, however, reveals that such a choice is illusory. The Act provides that no
"permit shall be issued unless the Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in
the public interest, or that failure to issue a permit will result in unreasonable economic
hardship to the owner."26 While this provision prohibits the issuance of a permit when both
of these conditions are absent, it by no means requires issuance when they are present. The
Mayor's Agent may refuse to issue a permit even after determining that doing so would
result in an unreasonable economic

24

See District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30, 34 (1998) (DC
Law "provides no mechanism for compensating a property owner if the Mayor's Agent declines to issue [a]
permit despite 'unreasonable economic hardship.'").
25
See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 31415 (1987) ("This basic understanding of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of
otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.").
26
D.C. CODE ANN. §6-1104.
7

hardship.27 Although such a decision would require the government to pay compensation
for the property taken, it demonstrates that no plaintiff can force the Mayor's Agent to issue
a demolition permit when doing so would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Act.
Finally, a petition for review of a demolition permit denial must be filed in the DC
Court of Appeals within thirty days of the Mayor's Agent's decision.28 The statute of
limitations on a takings claim, on the other hand, is six years. One important issue for
litigation purposes is whether a plaintiff is required to file a petition for review in the DC
Court of Appeals before filing a §1983 action in federal district court. In Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court held that a
constitutional takings claim is not ripe for judicial review unless the plaintiff has: 1)
received a final decision from the government entity charged with implementing the
regulation; and 2) pursued compensation through state inverse condemnation proceedings.29
According to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a plaintiffs failure to file
a petition for review in the DC Court of Appeals does not preclude a constitutional takings
claim in federal court.30 The denial of a demolition permit is a "final decision" for purposes
of satisfying Williamson County, and "District law does not provide a procedure to
compensate plaintiffs for denial of their building permit applications."31
27

See District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.C. 1998)
(holding that "even if [a plaintiff] successfully demonstrated 'unreasonable economic hardship,' [the Act]
would merely authorize, but not require, the Mayor's Agent to issue the permits over the objections of the
Board.").
28

RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS 15(a)(2) (2004).

29

Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
District Intown, 23 F. Supp.2d at 35.
31
Id.
30
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900 G Street Associates and District Intown Properties

A brief examination of two cases helps illustrate the difference between a regulatory
takings claim and an action for judicial review of a finding of no unreasonable economic
hardship. In 900 G Street Associates v. Department of Housing and Community
Development, a developer applied for a permit to demolish the Old Masonic Temple, an
individually designated landmark, on grounds of unreasonable economic hardship.32
Although the plaintiff had initially attempted to argue that the demolition was consistent
with the purposes of the Act, this claim was subsequently withdrawn.33 The Mayor's Agent
denied the permit application, holding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the
denial would preclude "any reasonable use of its property or return on its investment."34
The plaintiff appealed the decision to the DC Court of Appeals, arguing that the permit
denial amounted to a taking of private property without compensation.35 The plaintiff did
not, however, seek compensation for an unconstitutional taking; it merely sought judicial
review of the Mayor's Agent's denial of a permit application.36 Although the Court
acknowledged that the value of the property had been greatly diminished by the permit
denial, it nevertheless held that the plaintiff had failed to establish unreasonable economic
hardship.37 The Court observed that:
if there is a reasonable alternative economic use for the property after the
imposition of the restriction on that property, there is no taking, and hence
no unreasonable economic hardship to the owners, no matter how

32

900 G Street Associates v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development, 430 A.2d 1387 (D.C. 1981).
Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA No. 79-310 (December 21, 1979).
34
Id. at 11.
35
900 G Street Associates, 430 A.2d at 1389.
36
Id.
37 Id.1390-92.
9
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diminished the property may be in cash value and no matter if 'higher' or
'more beneficial' uses of the property have been proscribed.38
The Court also noted that the applicant bears the burden of proving that there are no
reasonable alternative economic uses for the property.39 The decision to deny the plaintiffs
permit was based upon the Mayor's Agent's determination that the plaintiff had failed to
satisfy that burden. The Court held that the record was "more than adequate to establish
that the Mayor's Agent could have reasonably concluded that an alternative economic use
for the Building exists."40
District Intown Properties, Ltd. v. District of Columbia Department of Consumer
and Regulatory Affairs provides a good example of a constitutional challenge to a permit
denial under the Takings Clause.41 District Intown Properties was the owner of Cathedral
Mansions, a three-building Georgian revival-style apartment complex with a large lawn
facing the National Zoo.42 Twenty-seven years after purchasing Cathedral Mansions,
District Intown filed an application to subdivide the subject property into nine lots of
record.43 The new property configuration consisted of one large lot underneath the existing
structures and eight smaller lots carved out of the lawn.44 District Intown had subdivided
the property with the intention of constructing a townhouse on each of the eight smaller lots
and applied for building permits to construct these townhouses in December 1988.45 While
the building permits were pending, an application was filed with the HPRB to designate the
Cathedral Mansions property (including the lawn) as an
38

Id. at 1390.
Mat 1391.
40
Id. at 1392.
41
District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (1999).
42
Id. at 877.
43
Id.
44
Id.
39
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historic landmark.46 The HPRB approved designation of Cathedral Mansions as an
individual landmark on May 17, 1989.47 In July 1989, the HPRB issued a recommendation
to deny the building permit applications.48 According to the Board, the proposed
construction would be incompatible with the property's historic landmark status.49 In
January 1992, District Intown once again applied for permits to construct townhouses on
the eight vacant lots, and the HPRB again recommended denial of the permits.50 The
Mayor's Agent adopted the Board's recommendation and further observed that District
intown had failed to carry its burden on the issues of unreasonable economic hardship and
special merit.51
On April 21, 1993, District intown filed a petition for review in the DC Court of
Appeals.52 It argued that the Mayor's Agent had exceeded his jurisdiction in making
findings of fact and entering conclusions of law with respect to unreasonable economic
hardship.53 According to District intown, the only proper consideration in reviewing permit
applications for new construction—as opposed to alteration or demolition—is whether the
proposed construction would be incompatible with the character of the landmark.54 District
intown did not request that the Court reverse the permit denial; it merely argued that those
portions of the decision discussing economic hardship should be

45

Id.

46 Id
47

Id.

48

Id.
Id. at 878.
"Id.
51
Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA No. 92-213-220 (March 8, 1993).
52
District Intown Properties Ltd. v. DCRA, 680 A.2d 1373 (D.C. 1996).
53
Id. at 1377.
54
Id. at 1378.
49
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vacated.55 Although it agreed that special merit and economic hardship were not
permissible considerations in the Mayor's Agent's review of new construction permits, the
Court dismissed the petition on justiciability grounds.56 District Intown had not, according
to the Court, been "adversely affected or aggrieved," nor had it suffered a legal wrong.57
This decision, however, was still a victory for District Intown. It had filed the petition for
review in the DC Court of Appeals because it had been concerned that the Mayor's Agent's
findings on the issue of economic hardship could have precluded a takings claim in another
forum. The DC Court of Appeals dismissed this concern, holding that "findings and
conclusions of the Mayor's Agent can have preclusive effect only if the Mayor's Agent
acted within his statutory authority in issuing them."58 Because the Mayor's Agent had
exceeded his statutory authority in discussing the issue of economic hardship, District
Intown would not be estopped from raising a takings claim in federal court.
On March 22,1996, District Intown filed a §1983 action in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging that the denial of its building permits had effected an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.59 It argued that the
denial of the building permits had rendered the eight vacant lots economically valueless
and thus worked a "total taking" under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.60 The
district court first engaged in the task of defining the relevant parcel of
55

Id. at 1375.

56

Id. at 1377-78.
Id. at 1377. This is a threshold requirement for judicial review of an agency decision under the DC
Administrative Procedure Act. See B.C. CODE ANN. § l-1510(a).
58
Id. at 1378.
59
District Intown Properties Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia, 23 F. Supp.2d 30 (D.C. 1998).
60
Id. at 35. Although the plaintiff conceded that the apartment building continued to produce rental income
and had a positive market value, it argued that each of the eight vacant lots was rendered valueless by the
57
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the property interest alleged to be taken.61 Because the apartment complex and lawn had
been operated as a single economic and functional entity for the duration of District
Intown's ownership, the Court held that the relevant parcel was the entire Cathedral
Mansions property.62 The eight vacant lots were not distinct parcels for purposes of the
takings analysis, and the denial of construction permits did not result in a Lucas-style total
taking. The proper framework for analysis, according to the Court, was the tripartite test
articulated in Penn Central. The Court proceeded to apply the Penn Central test and
determined that the denial of District Intown's permits had not effected a taking requiring
compensation.63 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the judgment of the district court, noting that "District Intown could not have had any
reasonable investment-backed expectations of development given the background
regulatory structure at the time of subdivision."64
These two cases illuminate some of the key differences between a constitutional
takings claim and a petition for review of a demolition permit denial. The substantive
standard applied by the courts will be the same in both cases, but the procedural and
remedial differences discussed above can become very important in developing strategies
for litigation. The analysis becomes a bit more complicated, however, when the plaintiff in
an economic hardship case satisfies the criteria for low-income owner status under the DC
Law.

permit denial. Id. A land use regulation that deprives an owner of "all economically viable use" of the
property effects a per se taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
61
District Intown, 23 F. Supp.2d at 35-37.
62
Id. at 36.
63
Id. at 37-39.
64
District Intown, 198 F.3d at 877.
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THELOW-INCOMEOWNERPROVISIONOFTHEDC LAW

For most property owners, a court's analysis of constitutional takings claims and
economic hardship claims under the DC Law will be identical (although the remedy will be
different). For "low-income owners," however, an unreasonable economic hardship is
defined as "an onerous and excessive financial burden."65 This raises two initial questions
of statutory construction: who qualifies as a "low-income owner," and what is an "onerous
and excessive financial burden"? Fortunately, the DC Municipal Code provides a clear
definition of "low-income owner" in the historic preservation context. The DCMR defines a
"low-income owner" as:
an owner who is an applicant when the application is for a building or site
owned by him or her and used as his or her principal place of residence,
and whose household income is eighty percent (80%) or less of the median
household income for the Washington Metropolitan Area as established
from time to time by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.66
This definition limits the reach of the low-income owner provision to owner-occupied
residential buildings owned by individuals who earn less than $44,000 per year.67 A more
difficult question is exactly which kinds of financial burdens should be considered
"onerous and excessive." To answer this question, one must examine the underlying
purposes of the provision.
It is clear that the low-income owner provision provides heightened statutory
protection beyond that guaranteed under federal constitutional law. For most property
owners, a permit can be issued only if the Mayor's Agent determines that denial will
65

D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1102(14).

66

10 D.C.M.R. § 2599.1 (2003).
14

render the property economically valueless. The costs of restoring a protected building are
not given significant weight in this calculus if there is any economically viable use for the
property. The "onerous and excessive financial burden" language, on the other hand,
seems to imply that low-income individuals maybe entitled to a demolition permit if the
costs of restoring the property exceed the owner's financial means. Such an interpretation
would allow the Mayor's Agent to grant a demolition permit in cases in which the
restoration of a protected property would be economically feasible but for the owner's lowincome status.
The Original Purpose of the Low-Income Owner Provision

An interpretation of the low-income owner provision that allows the demolition of
buildings that are capable of earning a reasonable economic return goes far beyond what is
generally considered to be the primary purpose of the economic hardship clause. If the
economic hardship provision functions solely as an escape hatch to avoid takings liability,
then the low-income provision doesn't make much sense. This tension suggests that the
DC Council's inclusion of the low-income owner provision in the DC Act was motivated
by other concerns.
One likely objective of the low-income owner provision is the mitigation of the
potential effects of gentrification caused by historic designation. During consideration of
the bill that eventually became the DC Law, some Council members expressed concern that
historic designation "would accelerate the displacement of poor persons from inner

67

HUD's median family income for the Washington, DC metropolitan area is $55,000 for Fiscal Year 2004.
See Estimated Median Family Incomes for FY 2004, available at
http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/IL/IL04/HUD-Medians.pdf (last visited on 04/01/04).
15

city neighborhoods."68 The original version of the DC Law did not include a low-income
owner provision.69 The provision was introduced in the Committee on Housing and Urban
Development as an amendment in November 1978.70 The unanimous adoption of this
amendment seemed to be informed by a belief that the very designation of an area as an
historic district would result in gentrification and the displacement of low-income residents.
The charge that gentrification results in the displacement of poor residents is
certainly a valid concern. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is some relationship
between increases in property values caused by gentrification and the subsequent
displacement of low-income residents. It is also beyond dispute that the DC Council acted
within its constitutional authority in creating a separate economic hardship standard for
low-income individuals.71 However, empirical evidence gathered since the enactment of the
DC Law suggests that there is no clear relationship between gentrification and the
involuntary displacement of low-income residents.72 Even if one were to assume that
gentrification does in fact cause displacement, it is not exactly clear how historic
68

Jeremy W. Dutra, "You Can't Tear It Down": The Origins of the D.C. Historic Preservation Act,
avai7a&/ea?http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/histpres/dc_hp_law.cfin?CFID=21713&CFTOKEN=33806655.
69
See DC Bill 2-367 (1978).
70
Amendment No. 2 to Bill 2-367 (November 14, 1978).
71
The low-income owner provision almost certainly passes constitutional muster under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, legislative
classifications that do not burden a suspect class or implicate a fundamental right will be upheld if they are
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440
U.S. 568 (1979). Wealth (or lack thereof) is not a suspect class. San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Protecting the District's low-income residents against displacement is certainly
a legitimate public purpose, and the low-income ownership provision is rationally related to that purpose.
72
See Lance Freeman & Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement, 8 THE URBAN PROSPECT 1 (2002),
available at http://www.chpcny.org (noting that poor households are less likely to move from gentrifying
neighborhoods than from non-gentrifying neighborhoods); Jacob L. Vigdor, Does Gentrification Harm the
Poor?, 2002 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 133, available at
http://muse.jhu.edU/journals/urb/toc/urb2002.l.html (corroborating Freeman and Braconi's findings). See
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designation stimulates gentrification. Gentrification is a social phenomenon that has not
been limited to historic districts. If there is a significant relationship between historic
designation and gentrification, it is likely that the relationship is caused not by the permit
review process, but by the substantial federal tax incentives that are available for
rehabilitation of historic properties.73 Whether federal tax law or the permit review process
causes gentrification is well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the
benefits of the low-income owner provision are uncertain at best. The costs, however, are
substantial.

Manipulation of the Low-Income Owner Provision

The low-income owner provision of the DC Law creates the potential for two
distinct types of abuse. First, individuals may employ creative accounting techniques to
satisfy the provision's maximum income requirement. The DC Act does not expressly
require the provision of personal income tax returns or other proof of income in economic
hardship claims.74 The Mayor's Agent may, however, "require that an applicant furnish

generally J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 How. L.J. 405 (2003) (discussing the empirical
literature on gentrification and displacement).
73
The Rehabilitation Investment Tax Credit (RITC) Program provides tax credits for the costs of
rehabilitating historic structures. See 36 C.F.R. § 67 (2004).
74
The DC Act provides that all economic hardship claimants must submit the following documentation to the
Mayor's Agent:
(A) For all property:
(i) The amount paid for the property, the date of purchase, and the party from whom
purchased, including a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and
the person from whom the property was purchased;
(ii) The assessed value of the land and improvements thereon according to the two most
recent assessments;
(iii) Real estate taxes for the previous two years;
(iv) Annual debt service, if any, for the previous two years;
(v) All appraisals obtained within the previous two years by the owner or applicant in
connection with his purchase, financing, or ownership of the property;
(vi) Any listing of the property for sale or rent, price asked, and offers received, if any;
and
(vii) Any consideration by the owner as to profitable adaptive use of the property; and
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such additional information as the Mayor believes is relevant to his determination of
unreasonable economic hardship and may provide in appropriate instances that such
additional information be furnished under seal."75 District regulations further provide that
individuals claiming low-income status must provide "a statement of present household
income and the number of persons in the household."76 The regulations do not discuss how
household income should be calculated. Although wages would certainly be viewed as
income, it is not clear if returns on investments or capital gains would count as well. The
absence of a clear standard for determining household income creates a very real possibility
of manipulation. For example, an affluent business owner could set her own income in a
way that creates the appearance of low-income status, in addition, the narrow focus on
household income would allow individuals with considerable assets but little nominal
income to qualify for low-income owner status. It is doubtful that the DC Council had such
individuals in mind when it drafted the low-income owner provision.
Second, developers and other parties might use genuinely low-income individuals
as straw parties to obtain demolition permits for protected properties. This tactic would
involve a developer selling a protected property to a low-income individual at a very low
price. The low-income owner would then apply for a permit to demolish the building on
economic hardship grounds. After razing the building, the straw party would then sell the
property back to the developer at a premium. Although the developer will still have to
comply with the permit review process, it will now be applying for a new construction
(B) For income-producing property:
(i) Annual gross income from the property for the previous two years;
(ii) Itemized operating and maintenance expenses for the previous two years;
(iii) Annual cash flow, if any, for the previous two years.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1104(g)(l).
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permit rather than a demolition permit. As a result, the developer's proposed construction
will enjoy a presumption of compatibility, and the burden of proving incompatibility will
shift to the government.77 The developer will still have to demonstrate that the proposed
construction is "not incompatible" with the character of the historic district. Nevertheless,
this tactic would allow demolitions that would be clearly impermissible under the regular
economic hardship provision. Section 6-1104 of the DC Act requires economic hardship
applicants to provide "a description of the relationship, if any, between the owner and the
person from whom the property was purchased." This provision suggests that the DC
Council may have anticipated exactly this kind of manipulation. Unfortunately, few
individuals acting as straw parties for developers are likely to disclose the true nature of
their relationship with them. The effective prevention of the low-income owner provision's
abuse will require safeguards other than those currently provided by the DC Act.

Potential Solutions: Fix It or Dump It?

The only completely effective way of preventing the types of abuse described above
would be to repeal the low-income owner provision. This proposal is not as radical as it
sounds, hi the twenty-five years that the Historic Landmark and Historic District
Protection Act has been in place, the Mayor's Agent has never issued a demolition permit
under the terms of the low-income owner provision. Those who would support keeping
75
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The permit review process for new construction provides that a building permit "shall be issued unless the
Mayor, after due consideration of the zoning laws and regulations of the District of Columbia, finds that the
design of the building and the character of the historic district or historic landmark are incompatible." D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-1107(f). Compare Id. at § 6-1104(e) ("No [demolition] permit shall be issued unless the
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the provision in place will argue that this fact suggests that any concern with its abuse is
overblown. It is clear, however, that the low-income owner provision creates the potential
for manipulation. The fact that developers haven't yet taken advantage of this opportunity
is an unpersuasive justification for keeping the provision in place. The provision's benefits
to low-income individuals are de minimis at best; the costs of its potential abuse are
tremendous. Unfortunately, no member of the DC Council is likely to propose repealing a
legislative provision that was designed to protect low-income individuals against
displacement. Given this political reality, other approaches to this problem must be
developed.
Preventing the first type of abuse—the use of misleading accounting techniques—
would require, at a minimum, a more searching inquiry into the economic status of the
applicant. First, the Mayor's Agent should consider—in addition to income received in the
form of wages and investments—the value of an applicant's other assets. An individual
who owns five cars and three houses shouldn't qualify for the low-income owner provision
simply because he has a nominal annual income below $44,000. Second, the Mayor's
Agent should not limit his inquiry to the applicant's "present household income." The
Mayor's Agent should examine income streams over a period of at least three to five years.
The current Mayor's Agent took a step in the right direction in the recent case of
Will and Gennet Purcell.78 Purcell involved an application for the installation of 48 vinyl
replacement windows on a corner house within the Greater U Street Historic District.

Mayor finds that issuance of the permit is necessary in the public interest, or that failure to issue a permit
will result in unreasonable economic hardship to the owner.").
78
Decision and Order of the Mayor's Agent, HPA Nos. 01-202; 01-515 (March 12, 2004).
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The Purcells sought an alteration permit after they had already replaced the original
wooden windows. Both the HPRB and the Mayor's Agent determined that the installation
of vinyl windows on the house was inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and
incompatible with the character of the historic district.79 During a hearing before the
Mayor's Agent, the plaintiffs argued that the denial of the alteration permit would impose
an unreasonable economic hardship upon them. Although both plaintiffs were attorneys,
they claimed to have a combined household income of only $8,000, which was well below
the maximum income limit of the low-income owner provision.80 Gennet Purcell had
recently been laid off from her position as an associate at a large law firm, and Will Purcell
was self-employed. The house, which had been purchased for $135,000 in April 2000, was
assessed at a value of $640,000 in 2002.81 The Mayor's Agent also examined the Purcells'
other assets and liabilities, which included two cars, rental income from a basement
apartment, bank account balances, and child support payments.82
The Mayor's Agent determined that the Purcells had failed to demonstrate
unreasonable economic hardship. In so holding, he observed that "to the extent that
Applicants are experiencing economic hardship, such circumstance is only temporary, due
to Gennet Purcell's unemployment status, and Will Purcell's low cash flow as he seeks to
build and expand his law practice."83 By setting up a distinction between "sustained" and
"temporary" low-income owners, the Mayor's Agent has provided a useful check against
the manipulation of the low-income owner provision. Because the
79

Id. at 1. The Mayor's Agent entered a default judgment after the applicants failed to show up for the
hearing on their permit application. The applicants later requested, and were granted, a rehearing on the issue
of economic hardship. Id.
80
Id. at 5.
81
Id. at 3-4.
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Purcells had failed to satisfy the low-income owner criteria, their ability to sell the house at
a gain precluded a finding of unreasonable economic hardship. While some applicants
might argue that this detailed scrutiny of financial records is unreasonably intrusive, it is
clear that the Mayor's Agent is authorized under the DC Law to require such
documentation.84
It will be considerably more difficult to erect effective safeguards against the second
kind of manipulation. As mentioned above, all economic hardship claimants must disclose
"the relationship, if any, between the owner and the person from whom the property was
purchased." It is clear, however, that a low-income owner who is acting as a straw party
will have a strong economic disincentive to disclosing the nature of his relationship with
the developer. Unless the Mayor's Agent allows the government to use polygraph tests and
trial lawyers to impeach the testimony of economic hardship applicants, there would appear
to be no way of distinguishing bona fide claimants from straw parties.
One potential solution to this problem would be the use of conservation easements
to ensure that any new construction on a property would be limited to the structure
proposed by the low-income owner at the time the demolition permit application is filed.
The term "conservation easement" is often used to describe restrictive covenants, negative
easements, and equitable servitudes that are created for the purpose of protecting
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See B.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1104(g)(2) ("The Mayor may require that an applicant furnish such additional
information as the Mayor believes is relevant to his determination of unreasonable economic hardship.").
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and managing historic, environmental, and other property resources.85 Although there are
a number of important legal differences between these distinct property interests, they are
functionally similar in that they each allow a private individual or group to obtain a
protective non-possessory interest in the property of another. Governments often obtain
protective easements as well. For example, District zoning regulations currently condition
permits for planned unit developments (PUDs) on the recordation of a covenant between
the property owner and its successors to use the property only in the manner specified.86
Until recently, the effectiveness of conservation easements in the historic preservation
context has been quite limited due to the common law requirements imposed on such
restrictions. For example, if a land use restriction imposed by a restrictive covenant did not
"touch and concern the land," the covenant would not bind successive owners of the
burdened property. The District of Columbia Uniform Conservation Easement Act
(UCEA) eliminated much of the uncertainty that often accompanies the use of negative
easements and servitudes for preservation purposes by removing the common
law requirements that often rendered them ineffective. There are at least three problems,
however, with the use of conservation easements for the protection of historic structures.

First, although the UCEA addresses some of the common law limitations placed
upon conservation easements, the Act expressly states that it "does not affect the power of a
court to modify or terminate a conservation easement in accordance with principles of
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John Walliser, Conservation Servitudes, 13 J. Nat. Resources & Envtl. L. 47, 48-50 (1997). For a general
discussion of the use of conservation easements in the historic preservation context, see Daniel McCall, The
Role of Easements in Historic Preservation: Implications of Valuing a Property Right as a Commodity
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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10 D.C.M.R. 2407.3 (2003).
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law and equity."88 There are two common law doctrines that allow courts to terminate
servitudes in certain situations. Under the "relative hardship" doctrine, the owner of
property that is burdened by a servitude can raise an affirmative defense that the
individualized burden of the restriction outweighs its benefits to the land.89 The doctrine of
"changed conditions" allows courts to refuse equitable enforcement of a servitude if
the property restriction has become obsolete.90 Under either of these doctrines, courts are
given an enormous amount of discretion to decide whether the costs of a servitude
outweigh its benefits, or if a land use restriction has become "obsolete." The continuing
viability of these doctrines in state courts undermines the effectiveness of easements and
other servitudes as preservation instruments.
Second, courts often construe servitudes very narrowly in order to avoid
enforcement, hi Foundation for the Preservation of Historic Georgetown v. Arnold, the DC
Court of Appeals narrowly construed a conservation easement to dismiss an enforcement
action against a landowner.91 After observing that the terms of the easement were
ambiguous, the Court held that an exterior alteration on the subject property did not violate
the easement. In so holding, the Court opined that "restrictions on land use should be
construed in favor of the free use of land and against the party seeking enforcement."92 It is
unlikely that conservation easements will adequately protect historic resources when judges
take this kind of an approach to their interpretation.
87
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Finally, there is a potential constitutional problem with conditioning the approval of
a building permit on the applicant's agreement to dedicate a conservation easement, in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held that a coastal
management agency violated the Takings Clause when it conditioned the approval of a
building permit on the plaintiffs agreement to dedicate a public easement across the drysand portion of its private beach.93 The Court observed that "unless the permit condition
[the exaction] serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building
restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.'"94
Although the Court did not prohibit the use of all development exactions, it did note that
there must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the public purpose that the
development ban is designed to achieve.95 in Dolan v. City of Tigard. the Supreme Court
tightened the requirements of the Nollan test.96 in addition to demonstrating the existence of
an "essential nexus," governments are now required to prove that the exaction is "roughly
proportional" to the public purpose it is designed to achieve.97 The Court held that the
governmental body must "make some sort of individualized determination that the required
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."98
Although Nollan and Dolan generally limit the ability of governments to use
exactions as land use planning devices, most conservation easements would have no
trouble satisfying the tests articulated in those cases. There is certainly an "essential
93

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id. at 837.
95
Id.
96
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
97
Id. at 391.
94

25

nexus" between the dedication of a conservation easement and the public purpose of
protecting the historic building to which the easement is attached. Most easements will
also be "roughly proportional" to the impact of the applicant's proposed construction.
Indeed, it would be difficult to design an exaction that is more narrowly tailored to
achieving the purpose of preservation than a conservation easement. Unless a conservation
easement bore almost no relationship to the maintenance of the character of an historic
district or landmark, the decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not appear to place any
significant limitations on the use of conservation easements in the historic preservation
context.
Although conservation easements can be a useful adjunct to a robust preservation
ordinance, the precarious nature of the protection that they provide makes them undesirable
as a standalone system for protecting historic resources. However, the fact that
conservation easements are not completely effective in preventing the demolition of
historic buildings is no reason to entirely dismiss their usefulness. Such easements can be
very effective in making the kinds of abuse described above much more difficult.
CONCLUSION

The low-income owner provision of the DC Law was designed to mitigate one of
the perceived effects of historic designation: gentrification and the concomitant
displacement of low-income residents. Unfortunately, the potential costs of the provision
far exceed its likely benefits. Although the relationship between historic designation and
the displacement of low-income residents is questionable, the repeal of the low-income
owner provision is highly unlikely. Increased scrutiny of the financial status of low-

98 Id.
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income applicants and the use of conservation easements can help minimize the potential
for abuse.
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